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The federal government’s power to tax is omnipotent. Federal taxes can be assessed in
any amount on anything or anyone for any reason.2 For all practical purposes, the Constitution
prescribes only one limit on the federal government’s power to tax: the Uniformity Clause,
which requires that indirect taxes, such as income and excise taxes, be “uniform throughout the
United States.”3 Uniformity should not be confused, however, with fairness or equality. There
is no requirement that rich people pay the same tax as poor or that oil companies pay the same
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tax as pharmaceutical companies or that married couples pay the same tax as singles. The
Uniformity Clause merely requires geographic uniformity; it is violated, therefore, only if the
federal government imposes a different tax on the residents of, say, Tennessee, than it imposes
on the residents of, say, Virginia.
It is exceedingly rare for a federal tax law to violate the Uniformity Clause.4 The Internal
Revenue Code does not fix different taxes for different states, for Congress has carefully crafted
the tax laws to avoid geographical distinctions.5 Unfortunately, the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) has not always been so careful. In recent years, the IRS has adopted a practice of
applying different tax laws to different states. This occurs when the IRS issues a formal opinion
declaring that it will not enforce certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code in states located
within certain federal circuits.6
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The author of this Article submits that the IRS’s non-uniform application of the tax law
violates the Uniformity Clause of the United States Constitution. In an endeavor to substantiate
this hypothesis, Section I of this Article will analyze the constitutional restrictions on the federal
government’s power to tax and the effect the 16th Amendment had on those restrictions. Section
II will offer examples of the IRS’s practice of applying tax laws in a non-uniform manner.
Section III will demonstrate why the IRS’s practice violates the Uniformity Clause. Section IV
will propose a practical and constitutional solution to the IRS’s arguably unconstitutional
practice.
Whether the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law violates the Uniformity
Clause is an issue of first impression. It has not been addressed by courts, except for an oblique
reference in Peony Park v. Webber,7 but that court sidestepped the issue by refusing to assume,
despite unambiguous evidence, that the IRS was applying different tax laws in different states.8
It also has been largely ignored by scholars, but that is not altogether surprising, for tax scholars,
as Professor Bittker explains, generally pay little attention to constitutional law: “[I]n law school
courses, once the instructor has finished flogging Eisner v. Macomber, the class usually moves
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on to the ‘real’ issues of federal income taxation, leaving the Constitution, including the sixteen
amendment, behind.”9
I.

The Constitution’s Taxation Provisions
Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government did not possess the power to

tax individuals or property.10 Rather, the federal government was forced to rely exclusively upon
state governments for revenue, a mechanism that quickly proved ineffectual:
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Constitutional Convention.”) (citations omitted). In the Articles of Confederation, the power to
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war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and
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Congress could not, under the old confederation, raise money by
taxes, be the exigencies ever so pressing and great. They had no
coercive authority—if they had, it must have been exercised
against the delinquent states, which would be ineffectual, or
terminate in a separation. Requisitions were a dead letter, unless
the state legislatures could be brought into action; and when they
were, the sums raised were very disproportional. Unequal
contributions or payments engendered discontent, and fomented
state-jealousy.11
The inability of the federal government to raise revenue was one of the reasons for the
Constitutional Convention of 1787.12 At that convention, the Framers of our current Constitution
vested in Congress broad, general powers to lay and collect taxes.13 These power are contained
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in the first clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which provides: “The Congress
shall have the Power To Lay and Collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States. . . .”14
The federal government’s authority to tax “is exhaustive and embraces every conceivable
power of taxation.”15 The expansive nature this power was acknowledged by the Supreme Court
as early as 1796, when Justice Paterson observed that it was “obviously the intention of the
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intention of the Convention that the whole power should be
conferred. The definition of particular words, therefore, became
unimportant. Id. at 541.
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framers of the Constitution that Congress should possess full power over every species of taxable
property, except exports.”16 More than a century later, Justice Cardozo, elaborating on the
breadth of the federal government’s power to tax, stated: “The subject-matter of taxation open to
the power of the Congress is as comprehensive as that open to the power of the states, though the
method may at times be different. . . .

[It] include[s] every form of tax appropriate to

sovereignty.”17
The Taxing Clause is construed liberally and flexibly in favor of the federal
government.18 Any tax designed to promote the general welfare of the nation is constitutional,
and it is for Congress, and not the courts, to decide which taxes promote the general welfare:

16

Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176. The Court continued: “The term taxes, is generical, and

was made use of to vest in Congress plenary authority in all cases of taxation. The general
division of taxes is into direct and indirect. Although the latter term is not to be found in the
Constitution, yet the former necessarily implies it. Indirect stands opposed to direct.” Id.
17

Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581 (1937) (upholding taxes on

employers pursuant to Social Security Act)..
18

La Croix v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 817, 821 (W.D. Tenn. 1935) (“It is the opinion

of this court that it was the purpose of the framers of the Constitution that this clause, giving the
right to levy taxes to pay the public debts, provide for the common defense and general welfare,
was to be applied as a liberal and flexible means of providing for the welfare of the United States
in times of disaster; provided, of course, that no other and restraining clause was violated.”).
7

“The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary
power, not an exercise of judgment.”19 Specifically, the power to choose one welfare over
another or a particular welfare over a general is vested in Congress.20 Accordingly, Congress has
broad powers to tax for the general welfare so long as it does not violate other constitutional
provisions:
as this court repeatedly has held, the power to tax carries with it the
power to embarrass and destroy; may be applied to every object
within its range in such measure as Congress may determine;
enables that body to select one calling and omit another, to tax one
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class of property and to forbear to tax another; and may be applied
in different ways to different objects . . . .21
The federal government’s power to tax, however, is not without limits. According to the
Constitution, “Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of
apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity.”22 Thus, the Constitution prescribes
three limits on the federal government’s power to tax.23 The first is that Congress may not tax
exports.24 The second is that capitation taxes and other direct taxes must be apportioned among
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the several states based on population.25 The third limit is that duties, imposts, excises, and other
indirect taxes must be uniform throughout the United States.26 In order to provide a complete
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In 1916, the Supreme Court observed that the

requirements of apportionment and uniformity are not so much limitations upon the complete
and all-embracing authority to tax, but simply regulations concerning the mode by which the
plenary power is to be exerted. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 13. Later decisions have called this
liberal interpretation of the Uniformity Clause into question.

The fact that the Supreme Court in 1916 categorized the
Uniformity Clause as a regulation does not convince this Court that
the Uniformity Clause is not also a limitation as the Supreme Court
used the word in Flast. The Uniformity Clause restricts the method
by which the Congress can assess taxes. Thus, it is a limitation on
the means by which Congress can tax.

This view of the

Uniformity Clause is consistent with other Supreme

Court

decisions. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 80, 103 S.Ct.
2239, 2242, 76 L.Ed.2d 427 (1983) (“The Uniformity Clause
conditions Congress’s power to impose indirect taxes.”); Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150, 31 S. Ct. 342, 348, 55 L.Ed.
389 (1911) (the Uniformity Clause allows Congress “to lay and
10

picture of the constitutional limits on Congress’s power to tax, all three these limitations are
examined in the next Section. The Uniformity Clause, however, is the primary focus of this
Article.
A.

The Export Clause

The Export Clause plainly states: “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported
from any State.”27 It categorically bars Congress from imposing taxes on exports.28 The Export

collect . . . taxes, duties, imposts and excises, upon which the
limitation is that they shall be uniform throughout the United
States”); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 85, 20 S.Ct. 747, 765,
44 L.Ed. 969 (1900) (“The tax imposed upon the distiller is in the
nature of an excise, and the only limitation upon the power of
Congress in the imposition of taxes of this character is that they
shall be uniform throughout the United States.”)
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Clause “was originally proposed by delegates to the Federal Convention from the Southern
States, who feared that the Northern States would control Congress and would use taxes and
duties on exports to raise a disproportionate share of federal revenues from the South.”29 To
allay such fears,30 the Framers’ couched the Export Clause in unconditional language that
protects all exports from federal tax burdens.31 Along with the Import-Export Clause,32 which
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exports should not be made a source of revenue to the national government, but that the national
government should put nothing in the way of burden upon such exports. If all exports must be
free from national tax or duty, such freedom requires, not simply an omission of a tax upon the
articles exported, but also a freedom from any tax which directly burdens the exportation; and, as
we have shown, a stamp tax on a bill of lading, which evidences the export, is just as clearly a
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prohibits states, without the consent of Congress, from laying “any Imposts or Duties on Imports
or Exports,” the Export Clause was “one of the compromises which . . . made possible the
adoption of the Constitution.”33
“[T]he Export Clause . . . specifically prohibits Congress from regulating international
commerce through export taxes, disallows any attempt to raise federal revenue from exports,
[but] has no direct effect on the way the States treat imports and exports.”34 In other words, the
Constitution “left to the states a greater power over exports than congress had, for by the ninth
section of the first article, they were prohibited from taxing exports, without any qualification,
even by the consent of the states; whereas, with the consent of congress, any state can impose
such a tax by law, subject to the conditions prescribed.”35
The Export Clause is not limited to taxes imposed exclusively on exports. It also applies
to “the imposition of a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory federal tax on goods in export

burden on the exportation as a direct tax on the article mentioned in the bill of lading as the
subject of the export.”).
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transit.”36 That is, the Export Clause exempts from federal taxation not only export goods, but
also services and activities closely related to the export process.37 Accordingly, even those taxes
that are imposed equally on exports and imports or other articles of commerce may be prohibited
by the Export Clause,38 for exports are not to be obstructed by the burdens of federal taxation.39
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Clause], that adopted by our earlier cases, is that the Framers sought to alleviate their concerns
by completely denying to Congress the power to tax exports at all.”). To determine whether a
tax is an export tax, as compared to a general tax on property, a court must examine the
immediacy of exportation and the proximity of the tax imposed to the value of the articles
exported. United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907 F. Supp. 408, 417 (Ct. Int’l Trade
1995), aff’d, 114 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1997), aff’d, 523 U.S. 360 (1998).
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The Export Clause does not, however, preclude federal taxation of pre-export goods and
services.40 Thus, general excise taxes on property, such as a tax on all distilled spirits, and
income taxes derived from the exporting business are not prohibited by the Export Clause,41 as
that Clause applies only to taxes laid on exports or matters related to exports and not on taxes
laid generally on the manufacture or handling of products.42
The Export Clause applies only to international commerce,43 and is limited to “goods.”44
It does not apply to passengers.45 Although the Export Clause is a genuine limitation on the
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situated.” Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 427 (1904).
41
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some of which are exported); William E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918) (upholding
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destined for U.S. territories are not subject to the Export Clause. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt,
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federal government’s power to tax, its scope is quite limited.46 It applies exclusively to taxes on
the international exportation of goods. As such, it plays no significant role in the IRS’s circuitspecific application of the tax law, which, of course, is the focus this Article.47

324 U.S. 652 (1945) (exports to Philippines); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901)
(exports to Puerto Rico).
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U.S. at 367 (“the Export Clause allows no room for any federal tax, however generally
applicable or nondiscriminatory, on goods in export transit.”).
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(“The passengers on Carnival’s cruise ships are neither ‘articles’ nor ‘goods.’ They are people.
The application of the Harbor Tax to them would not involve the laying of any tax upon
“Articles” exported from any state. ‘Articles’ and ‘goods’ relate to items of commerce, not
people. To apply the Export Clause to people would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of
the Clause.”).
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B.

The Apportionment Clauses

The Constitution provides that “direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included in the Union, according to their respective Numbers”48 and that
“[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or
Enumeration herein directed to be taken.”49 These clauses are designed to ensure that the
citizens of each state pay no more than their proportional share of direct taxes.50
The apportionment clauses were proposed by southern states to prevent the federal
government from imposing a tax on land or slaves, which would disproportionately burden
southerners:
The [southern states] possess a large number of slaves; they had
extensive tracts of territory, thinly settled, and not very productive.
A majority of the states had but few slaves, and several of them
limited territory, well settled, and in high state of cultivation. The
southern states, if no provision had been introduced in the
Constitution, would have been wholly at the mercy of the other

48
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Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 96 (1900); Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (Paterson,

J.) (“each state will be debited for the amount of its quota of the tax, and credited for its
payment”).
17

states. Congress in such case, might tax slaves, at discretion or
arbitrarily, and land in every part of the Union at the same rate or
measure: so much a head in the first instances, or so much an acre
in the second. To guard against imposition in these particulars,
was the reason for introducing the clause in the Constitution . . . .51
As a result, the Framers insisted that direct taxes be apportioned among the states based
on population. Assume Congress, for example, enacts a direct tax, such as a federal property tax,
to raise $50 million. For this tax to be constitutional, its burden must be apportioned among the
50 states based on population. A sparsely populated state like South Dakota cannot be required
to pay the same amount (e.g., $1 million) as a densely populated state like California. Rather,
the citizens of each state must pay only a proportional amount of the federal tax burden based on
that state’s population.
Not long after the Constitutional Convention, it became apparent that compliance with
the apportionment clauses would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve:
It appears to me that a tax on carriages cannot be laid by rule of
apportionment, without very great inequality and injustice. For
example: Suppose two States, equal in census, to pay 80,000
dollars each, by a tax on carriages, of 8 dollars on every carriage;
and in one State there are 100 carriages, and in the other 1000.
The owners of carriages in one State, would pay ten times the tax
of owners in the other. A, in one State, would pay for his carriage
8 dollars, but B, in the other State, would pay for his carriage, 80
dollars.52
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Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 177.

52

See, e.g., Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (Chase, J.)
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Compliance with the apportionment clauses, therefore, was a formidable obstacle to direct
federal taxes, ultimately prompting the 16th Amendment.
1.

What Are Direct Taxes?

Originally, “direct taxes” were defined to include only capitation taxes (e.g., poll taxes)53
and taxes on real property imposed solely by reason of ownership by the taxpayer.54 Later, taxes
on personal property, and taxes on the income from both real and personal property, such as rents
and interest on bonds, were held to be direct taxes.55
Direct taxes are levied upon persons and their possession or enjoyment of rights, whereas
indirect taxes are levied upon events, such as transferring, exchanging, or using property.
Indirect taxes are not subject to the apportionment clauses. Examples of direct taxes include

53

Even if a poll tax were to pass muster under the apportionment clauses, it is highly

unlikely that a poll tax could survive an equal protection challenge. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia
St. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding that Virginia’s poll tax violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
54

Federalist No. 21 (“Those of the direct kind, which principally relate to land and

buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment. Either the value of land, or the number of the
people, may serve as a standard.”); Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (Chase, J.) (direct taxes
limited to capitations and taxes on land); Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 160, 166 (4th Cir.
1962).
55

Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (invalidating income tax).
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local property taxes, state ad valorem taxes, and, presumably, European-style wealth taxes.56
These taxes are imposed directly on the taxpayer or his or her property; they are not imposed on
transfers or exchanges of property.
For all practical purposes, there are only two types of direct taxes: capitation taxes, such
as poll taxes, and taxes on real and personal property ownership, such as real estate or ad
valorem taxes. As a result, the apportionment clauses have little relevance to modern federal
taxation because there are no federal poll taxes or federal property taxes.57 Instead, the federal
government raises most, if not all, of its internal revenue via indirect taxes, such as excise taxes,
death taxes, and income taxes. The Supreme Court has consistently held that excise and death
taxes are not direct taxes and, therefore, not subject to the apportionment clauses.58 The law has
been less certain, however, with regard to income taxes.
Prior to the passage of the 16th Amendment, there was considerable uncertainty over
whether income taxes were direct or indirect. As early as 1874, the Supreme Court held that a
tax upon income was a duty rather than a direct tax, and thus federal income taxes were not

56

Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (Chase, J.) (direct taxes limited to capitations and taxes

on land).
57

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 200 (1997).

58

See, e.g., Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 54-55 (upholding 1898 inheritance tax as a valid excise

tax and not a direct tax).
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required to be apportioned among the states.59 It reaffirmed this conclusion in 1880, when it held
that a tax levied on personal income, gains, and profits is an excise or duty and not a direct tax.60
From 1880 to 1895, there appeared to be a consensus that income taxes were indirect excise
taxes not subject to the apportionment clauses.
In 1895, however, the Supreme Court changed course, holding that taxes on the income
(e.g., rent) derived from real property was the legal equivalent of a direct tax on the property
itself and thus must be apportioned.61 As a result, the Court invalidated an income tax on rents
that was not apportioned among the states. Later that year, the Court ruled that a tax on income
derived from personal property was also a direct tax and that the law imposing such tax was

59

Smedberg v. Bentley, 22 F. Cas. 368 (N.J. Cir. 1874) (No. 12,964 ) (“Under the

constitutional designation of the different kinds of taxation to which resort might be made by
congress, a tax upon incomes must be classed among the duties authorized, rather than among
the direct taxes. No apportionment is necessary when it is laid, and there is nothing to be done
here but to sustain the demurrer to the first count of the plaintiff’s declaration, and it is ordered
accordingly.”). In 1868, the Supreme Court held that a gross receipts tax on the amounts
insured, renewed, or continued by insurance companies was a duty or excise and not a direct tax.
Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1968). See also Veazie Bank, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at
547 (upholding 10% tax on notes state banks paid to other banks).
60

Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880) (income tax is an indirect tax).

61

Pollock, 157 U.S. at 639.
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unconstitutional for failure to comply with the apportionment clauses.62 In so doing, the Court
stated:
The tax imposed by sections twenty-seven to thirty-seven,
inclusive of the act of 1894, so far as it falls on the income from
real estate and of personal property, being a direct tax within the
meaning of the Constitution, and therefore unconstitutional and
void because not apportioned according to representation. . . .63
Moreover, the Court found that the provisions of the act taxing income derived from real
and personal property were inseparable from the remainder of the Revenue Act of 1894.
Consequently, the Court invalidated the entire 1894 federal income tax scheme:
We do not mean to say that an act laying by apportionment a direct
tax on all real estate and personal property, or the income thereof,
might not also lay excise taxes on business, privileges,
employments, and vocations. But this is not such an act, and the
scheme must be considered as a whole. Being invalid as to the
greater part, and falling, as a tax would, if any part were held valid,
in a direction which could not have been contemplated except in
connection with the taxation considered as an entirety, we are
constrained to conclude that [the Act is] wholly inoperative and
void.64
The Court thus concluded that a tax on a taxpayer’s entire income, if it included income
derived from property, is a direct tax and therefore must be apportioned among the states based
on population.65
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Pollock, 157 U.S. at 637.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 637.
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2.

The 16th Amendment

Pollock raised serious doubts about whether income taxes were direct or indirect taxes.66
It also started a debate over whether a federal income tax could be imposed consistent with the
Constitution. The 16th Amendment, however, rendered this debate academic. Ratified in 1913,
the 16th Amendment provides that “Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on
income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.”67 The purpose of the 16th Amendment was to
relieve Congress of the obligation to apportion any tax on classes of income which would require
apportionment due to its source.68 Under the 16th Amendment, Congress has the power to tax
income from whatever source derived—labor, real estate, personal property, etc.—without

66

Subsequent decisions have generally held that taxes on income are not direct taxes. See

e.g., Richardson v. United States, 294 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1961) (tax on accrued interest of notes
passing to certain legatees not a direct tax); Jones v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 578 (N.D.N.Y.
1982) (tax on wages is not a direct tax); Krzyske v. Commissioner, 548 F. Supp 101 (E.D. Mich
1982) (social security taxes are not direct taxes).
67

U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (emphasis added).

68

Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 17-19.
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concern for apportionment. Thus, the apportionment clauses are no longer a barrier to federal
income taxes.69
In sum, the apportionment clauses are not a barrier to federal income, death, or excises
taxes, and these taxes comprise most, if not all, of the federal government’s internal revenue.70
Today, the apportionment clauses would pose a barrier only to a federal property or wealth tax,
both of which are unlikely to be invoked.

69

The apportionment clauses would still inhibit the federal government’s imposition of

property or wealth taxes. Of course, “[t]here is no federal property tax. Imposition of a federal
property tax would be politically impractical because the Constitution requires that ‘direct’ taxes
be proportional to the population of each state. Thus, if a federal property tax were imposed,
people living in a state with 50% of the country’s population but only 20% of the country’s
property value would still be required to pay 50% of the total federal property tax bill. The
federal government has levied property taxes twice: in 1798 and in 1813. The taxes were
apportioned among the states as constitutionally required.” John A. Swain, The Taxation of
Private Interests in Public Property: Toward a Unified Theory of Property Taxation, 2000 UTAH
L. REV. 421 n.2. See also Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes be Justified, 53 Tax L. Rev. 263,
269 n.14 (2000) (arguing that a federal wealth tax would be subject to apportionment).
70

The Supreme Court has generally assumed that once a tax is found to be outside the

reach of the apportionment clauses, it is an indirect tax subject to the Uniformity Clause.
Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 83.
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C.

The Uniformity Clause

The Uniformity Clause limits the federal government’s power to impose indirect taxes.71
It provides: “The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, . . . but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”72
But what does the term “uniform” mean?73

71

Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 80. By contrast, the apportionment clauses limit the federal

government’s power to impose direct taxes. See Section I.B., supra.
72

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (emphasis added). The Uniformity Clause applies only to

the 50 states and not to Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories. Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
287 (1901) (upholding duty on merchandise imported from Puerto Rico). The Uniformity
Clause has received little attention from the courts. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never
invalidated a tax law on the basis of the Uniformity Clause. As Professor Bittker aptly states, the
Uniformity Clause “might have dramatically influenced the structure of the federal income tax,
but has shriveled away to a mere flyspeck.” Bittker, supra note 8, at 9.
73

The Framers themselves were uncertain as to the meaning of indirect taxes:: “What is

the distinction between direct and indirect taxes? It is a matter of regret that terms so uncertain
and vague in so important a point are to be found in the Constitution. We shall seek in vain for
any antecedent settled legal meaning to the respective terms. There is none. We shall be as
much at a loss to find any disposition of either which can satisfactorily determine the point.”
Springer, 102 U.S. at 597- 598 (quoting Alexander Hamilton).
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The Framers of the Constitution furnished little guidance on the meaning of “uniform.”74
The concerns giving rise to the Uniformity Clause, however, provide some insight into its
purpose. Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government lacked the power to
regulate interstate commerce, resulting in interstate trade barriers and regionalism.75 Prior to the

74

Reference to other clauses in the Constitution is also unhelpful. There are two other

uniformity clauses in the Constitution: the Bankruptcy Clause and the Naturalization Clause.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The Bankruptcy Clause vests in Congress the power to “establish .
. . uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” Id. Unlike the
narrow construction it has given to the Taxation Uniformity Clause, the Supreme Court in
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, held that the Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause
requires that all similarly situated individuals be treated the same. 455 U.S. 457, 472-73 (1982).
The Court acknowledge that it construed the two Uniformity Clauses differently, despite the fact
that they are both contained in Article I, Section 8. The Court based this distinction, however, on
the intent of the Framers. The Naturalization Uniformity Clause was intended, not as an antidiscrimination provision, but rather as a grant of exclusive power to the federal government over
immigration matters. In re Hood, 319 F.3d 755, 763 (6th Cir. 2003).
75

JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL

OF THE

FEDERAL CONVENTION 46-48 (E. Scott ed. 1898).

The sole power to regulate commerce was vested in the states. See ARTS.

OF

CONFEDERATION,

art. IV (“the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State,
and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties,
impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions
26

Constitution Convention of 1787, Americans were accustomed to putting the interests of their
respective states or regions over that of the nation.76 In an effort to remedy this situation and
unify the nation, the Framers of the Constitution vested the power to regulate interstate
commerce in the federal government.77 Some states remained concerned, however, that the

shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to any other
State of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction
shall be laid by any State, on the property of the United States, or either of them.”).
76

DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 397 (2001). See also PAUL C. NAGEL, JOHN

QUINCY ADAMS 50 (1997) (“[T]he Congress of the United States, operating under the severe
restrictions contained in the Articles of Confederation . . . seemed unable to cope with the young
republic’s growth. This was especially apparent in interstate and foreign commerce. The
national economy had become sorely depressed.”). Not surprisingly, the economic woes of the
nation led to social unrest, the most notable event being the short-lived Shay’s Rebellion, in
which a group of debt-ridden farmers banded together and closed courthouses in order to
forestall creditors. Robert A. Gross, The Uninvited Guest: Daniel Shays and the Constitution, in
IN DEBT TO SHAYS: THE BICENTENNIAL

OF AN

AGRARIAN REBELLION 1, 1-2 (Robert A. Gross

ed., 1993).
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2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 308 (rev. ed.

1937); see also, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180 (1992) (“the Framers no doubt
endowed Congress with the power to regulate interstate commerce in order to avoid further
instances of the interstate trade disputes that were common under the Articles of Confederation .
27

regionalism that marked the Articles of Confederation would continue.78 These states were
worried that the federal government would use its power over interstate commerce to favor
certain states.79 Some of the delegates at the Convention were fearful of conspiracies by large

. . .”); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (“Under the Articles of
Confederation, state taxes and duties hindered and suppressed interstate commerce; the Framers
intended the Commerce Clause as a cure for these structural ills.”).
78

FARRAND, supra note 76, at 308.

79

CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING

OF THE

CONSTITUTION 586-587 (1928). The Clause

was proposed on August 25 and adopted on August 31 without discussion. The origins of the
Uniformity Clause are linked to those of the Port Preference Clause. The Port Preference Clause
provides: “No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the
Ports of one State over those of another, nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be
obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.” ART. I, § 9, cl. 6. The purpose of the Port
Preference Clause is to give small states protection against deliberate discrimination by other,
more powerful states. Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1032 n.14 (5th Cir. 1991). The Port
Preference Clause does not prohibit legislation that incidentally prefers some ports over others.
Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1558 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 906 (1991).
Rather, its purpose is to prevent the federal government from discriminating between states.
Pennsylvania v. Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 435 (1855) (Nelson, J., concurring). Like the
Tax Uniformity Clause, the Port Preference Clause is a limit on the federal government, and not
state governments. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1876). The Port Preference Clause and
28

states or regional combinations.80

According to Justice Story, the Uniformity Clause was

promulgated to:
cut off all undue preferences of one State over another in the
regulation of subjects affecting their common interests. Unless
duties, imposts, and excises were uniform, the grossest and most
oppressive inequalities, vitally affecting the pursuits and
employments of the people of different states, might exist. The
agriculture, commerce, or manufactures of one State might be built
up on the ruins of another; and a combination of a few States in
Congress might secure a monopoly of certain branches of trade and
business to themselves, to the injury, if not the destruction, of their
less favored neighbors.81
The Uniformity Clause, therefore, is designed to ensure that Congress does not impose an
indirect tax on the citizens of one state different than that imposed on the citizens of another
state.82
The Uniformity Clause was proposed on August 25, 1787 and adopted by the Framers on
August 31, 1787 without discussion.83 As adopted, the language provided that all taxes shall be

the Tax Uniformity Clause were proposed together and reported out of a special committee as an
interrelated limitation on the national government’s commerce power. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at
103-106. They were separated without explanation when James Madison remedied the omission
from the Tax Uniformity Clause. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 81 n.10.
80

FARRAND, supra note 76, at 308.

81

1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 957

(T. Cooley ed. 1873).
82

Apache Bend Apartments, 702 F. Supp. at 1296.
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“uniform and equal” throughout the United States. This clause was proposed by delegates from
Maryland.84 But when the Committee on Style reported the final draft of the Constitution to the
Framers, it failed to include the tax uniformity clause.85 Two days later, however, this omission
was noticed and corrected by James Madison, who handwrote the term “uniform” into Article I,
Section 8, but omitted the term “equal.”86
1.

What is “Uniformity”?

Following the ratification of the Constitution, a debate ensued as to the scope of the
Uniformity Clause. Some argued that the Uniformity Clause required intrinsic fairness and
equality among taxpayers. According to this view, a federal tax must be levied in precisely the
same manner and amount upon all individuals.87 A tax that treats two people differently would

83

Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 81 n.10.

84

Luther Martin, Genuine Information, Delivered to the Legislature of the State of

Maryland (Nov. 12, 1787), in RECORDS

OF THE

FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 28, at 172,

205.
85

Id.
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CIVILIZATION 307 (1993).
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Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 84.
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OF

TAXES

ON THE

COURSE

OF

not, accordingly, be uniform. This view found support in Hylton v. United States,88 a case in
which the Supreme Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of a federal tax on
carriages.

In that case, Justice Paterson stated:

“Uniformity is an instant operation on

individuals, without regard to the intervention of assessments, or any regard to states. . . .”89
Similarly, Justice Iredell, voting to uphold the carriage tax, opined “the tax ought to be uniform,
because the present Constitution was particularly intended to affect individuals, and not states. . .
.”90
A few years later, the Supreme Court, upholding a federal excise tax on distillers, again
lent support to the argument that the Uniformity Clause required equality among taxpayers:
The law is not in our judgment subject to any constitutional
objection. The tax imposed upon distillers is in the nature of an
excise, and the only limitation upon the power of Congress in the
imposition of taxes of this character is that they shall be “uniform
throughout the United States.” The tax here is uniform in its
operation; that is, it is assessed equally upon all manufacturers of
spirits, wherever they are. The law does not establish one rule for
one distiller and a different rule or another, but the same rule for all
alike.91
The view that the Uniformity Clause required intrinsic fairness and equality was shortlived. By the late 19th Century, the Supreme Court declared once and for all that the Uniformity

88

3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).

89

Id. at 181.

90

Id. at 181.

91

United States v. Singer, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 111, 121 (1872).
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Clause simply requires geographic uniformity. That is, an indirect tax “is uniform when it
operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.”92 There
is no requirement that the tax apply equally to all taxpayers. This view was first pronounced in
the Head Money Cases,93 in which the Supreme Court upheld a federal head tax on persons
immigrating through port cities such as New York. Challengers of the head tax had argued that
it was not uniform because it applied to persons immigrating at port cities but not to those
immigrating at inland cities. The Court, however, sustained the tax, concluding that because the
tax applies to all port cities alike, “there is substantial uniformity within the meaning and purpose
of the Constitution.”94
“Subsequent cases have confirmed that the Framers did not intend to restrict Congress’s
ability to define the class of objects to be taxed. They intended only that the tax apply wherever
the classification is found.”95

Thus, Congress may distinguish between similar classes in

selecting the subject of a tax. For example, in Knowlton v. Moore,96 the Supreme Court upheld a
federal inheritance tax despite the fact that the law imposed a progressive tax on legacies and

92

Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson), 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884).

93

112 U.S. 580 (1884).

94

Id. at 595.

95

See, e.g., Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 82.

96

178 U.S. 41 (1900).
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varied the rate of tax among classes of legatees. In so doing, the Court reaffirmed that the
Uniformity Clause simply requires geographic uniformity and not intrinsic equality.
The Knowlton court gave three reasons for rejecting an intrinsic equality interpretation of
the Uniformity Clause. First, if the Framers had intended something more than geographic
uniformity, there would have been no reason to add the phrase “throughout the United States” in
Article I, Section 8. That phrase clearly denotes a geographic limitation and would be redundant
if the Uniformity Clause required intrinsic equality among individual taxpayers.97 To interpret
that phrase otherwise would “lead to a disregard of the elementary canon of construction which
requires that effect be given to each word of the Constitution.”98 Second, the Framers imposed
two limits on Congress’s power to tax: direct taxes must be apportioned among the states based
on population and indirect taxes must be uniform throughout the United States. The purpose of
the apportionment clauses is to protect individual taxpayers from paying disproportionate shares
of federal taxes. The apportionment clauses, therefore, impose a form of intrinsic equality. But
this intrinsic equality applies only to direct taxes. If the Framers had intended to extend this
intrinsic equality to indirect taxes, they would not have distinguished the two taxes.99 Thus, for

97

Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 87.

98

Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 87.

99

Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 89 (“Now, that the requirement that direct taxes should be

apportioned among the several states, contemplated the protection of the States, to prevent their
being called upon to contribute more than was deemed their due share of the burden, is clear.”).
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indirect taxes, the Framers must have intended only geographic uniformity.100

Third, the

experience in England and the American states and colonies provided no evidence that indirect
taxes must be imposed in an intrinsically equal manner. To the contrary, the experience in those
jurisdictions, and the records of the Continental Congress and Constitution Convention of
1787,101 made clear that the Uniformity Clause mandates nothing more than geographic
uniformity.102
Ever since Knowlton, it has been clear that “the uniformity in excise taxes enacted by the
Constitution is geographic uniformity, not uniformity of intrinsic equality and operation. . . . The
Constitution does not command that a tax have an equal effect in each State.”103 Rather,
geographic uniformity simply precludes the federal government from imposing “a different tax

100

Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 87-89.

101

Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 101 (“[N]ot a single word is found in any of the debates . . .

which gives the slightest intimation that any suggestion was even made that the grant of power to
[impose an indirect] tax was considered from the point of view of its operation on the
individual.”)
102

Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 89-106. “By the result of an analysis of the history of the

adoption of the Constitution it becomes plain that the words ‘uniform throughout the United
States’ do not signify an intrinsic, but simply a geographical, uniformity.” Id. at 106.
103

Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 359 (1945) (upholding federal estate tax).
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in one state or states than was levied in another state or states.”104 A “tax is uniform when it
operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.”105 Thus,
a tax law may not be “drawn on state political lines.”106
There is no lack of uniformity, however, simply because the subject of the tax is not
found in some states107 or because “[d]ifferences in state law . . . may bring a person within or
without a category designated by Congress as taxable . . . .”108 An indirect tax may affect
citizens of different states differently, as long as the purpose of the tax is not to favor the citizens
of one state over the citizens of another state.109 The Uniformity Clause does not require a tax to
be intrinsically uniform; that is, it is not necessary that the tax operate upon one individual in

104

Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 12.

105

Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 594.
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Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 78.
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Fernandez, 326 U.S. at 359.
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Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 117 (1930) (“differences of state law, which may bring

a person within or without the category designated by Congress as taxable, may not be read into
the Revenue Act to spell out a lack of uniformity”); Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17-18 (1927)
(federal estate tax credit for state inheritance taxes paid is uniform despite the fact that Florida
does not have an inheritance tax).
109

Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 85-86.
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precisely the same manner as on all individuals.110 Indeed, indirect taxes will necessarily affect
taxpayers in different states differently since states naturally will have different quantities on the
subject being taxed.111 “Perfect uniformity and perfect equality of taxation . . . is a baseless
dream. . . .”112 Accordingly, a tax law is uniform if the same rates apply generally throughout
the United States.113

110

Chiles v. United States, 61 A.F.T.R.2d 81-1378 (D. Or. 1986).

111

Apache Bend Apartments, 702 F. Supp. at 1296. “This created the possibility of most

of the revenue from the tax on this activity coming from a few states where the activity is widely
conducted, and very little revenue from those states where the activity is relatively unimportant.”
Chiles, 61 A.F.T.R.2d at 88-1378. Congress is not even prohibited from using geographic terms
to define a class of objects to be taxed. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 84 (taxation of “Alaskan oil”
upheld where tax applied, at the very same rate, in all portions of the United States where the
subject of the tax is found).
112

Head Money Case, 112 U.S. at 595 (citation omitted) (“Is a tax on tobacco void,

because in many of the States no tobacco is raised or manufactured? Is the tax on distilled spirits
void, because a few states pay three-fourths of the revenue arising from it?”).
113

Heitsch v. Kavanagh, 200 F.3d 178, 180 (6th Cir. 1952) (upholding estate tax despite

the fact that some taxpayers settle with the government for less than the full rate); R.C. Tway
Coal Co. v. Glenn, 12 F. Supp. 570, 595 (W.D. Ky. 1935) (1 ½ percent tax per ton of coal is a
uniform tax).
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2.

What Are Indirect Taxes?

The Uniformity Clause identifies three categories of indirect taxes: duties, imposts, and
excises.114 For all practical purposes, however, the Uniformity Clause applies to any tax that is
not a direct tax
The terms duties, imposts and excises are generally treated as
embracing the indirect forms of taxation contemplated by the
Constitution. Therefore, if a tax is not a direct tax, it falls within
the general category of indirect taxes, and it is a matter of no
moment whether its classification be further refined as a duty, or
an impost, or an excise.115
Whether a tax is direct or indirect depends upon what is being taxed.116 “Direct taxes
bear immediately upon persons, upon the possession and enjoyment of rights; indirect taxes are
levied upon the happening of an event or an exchange.”117 For example, a tax imposed upon a

114

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

115

Penn Mut. Indem., 32 T.C. at 660-61.

116

Alexander Hamilton, Defence of the Funding System, July 1795, in 19 THE PAPERS OF

ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 22, 25 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1973) (“In all but direct taxes the
Constitution requires uniformity.”).
117

Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 47.
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particular use of property incidental to ownership is an excise tax.118 An excise taxis is “an
indirect tax, one not directly imposed upon persons or property, and is one that is imposed on the
performance of an act, the engaging in any occupation, or the enjoyment o[f] a privilege.”119
Another example of an indirect tax is the federal estate and gift tax, which is imposed on
the transfer of property and not the property itself:
Although different modes of assessing such duties prevail, and
although they have different accidental names, such as probate
duties, stamp duties, . . . estate taxes, or privilege taxes,
nevertheless tax laws of this nature in all countries rest in their
essence upon the principle that death is the generating source from
which the particular taxing power takes its being, and that it is the
power to transmit, or the transmission from the dead to the living,
on which such taxes are more immediately rested.120
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Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929) (estate tax, which included within

gross estate transfers made in contemplation of death, is an indirect tax not subject to
apportionment).
119

In re Tri-Manufacturing & Sales Co., 82 B.R. 58, 60 (Bankr. S. D. Ohio 1988).
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Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 56. See also Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 502-03

(1930).
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Income taxes121 and corporate taxes122 are also indirect taxes because they are imposed
on the earning of money and not directly on individuals or property.123 The list of taxes found to
be indirect by the Supreme Court is extensive:
a ‘license’ or ‘special’ tax upon dealers in certain commodities
(License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462; cf. South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437); a tax on sales at commodity exchanges
(Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509); a tax on the transfer or sale of
securities (Treat v. White, 181 U.S. 264; Thomas v. United States,
192 U.S. 363; Provost v. United States, 269 U.S. 443); a tax on the
issuance of State bank notes (Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533);
a tax on manufactured tobacco having reference to its origin and
intended use (Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608); a tax on the
manufacture and sale of oleomargarine (McCray v. United States,
195 U.S. 27); a tax on devolutions of title to real estate (Scholey v.
Rew, 23 Wall. 331); a tax on the receipt of legacies (Knowlton v.
Moore, 178 U.S. 41); a tax on transfers at death (New York Trust
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345); a tax on transfers inter vivos
(Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124).
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Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 15; Apache Bend Apartments, 702 F. Supp. at 1295) (1986 Tax

Reform Act that granted temporary exemptions to certain taxpayers does not violate Uniformity
Clause).
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Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 151-52 (1911) (upholding corporate income
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See generally, C. Johnson, The Illegitimate “Earned” Requirement in Tax and Nontax

tax).

Accounting, 50 Tax. L. Rev. 373, 412 (1995) (“viewed as a tax on earnings, the income tax is an
indirect tax”).
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Indeed, in response to the contention in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, that the estate tax was a
direct tax, the Supreme Court swept away all logical arguments with Justice Holmes’s infamous
statement: “Upon this point a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”124 The category of
indirect taxes, therefore, is “wide and comprehensive . . . in striking contrast to the very narrow
range within which ‘direct’ taxes have been limited. . . .”125
3.

The 16th Amendment

The 16th Amendment had no effect on the Uniformity Clause,126 so federal income tax
laws are still required to be “uniform throughout the United States.”127 This, of course, calls into
question the necessity of the 16th Amendment. The federal government had the power to tax

124

256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (holding that federal estate tax is an indirect tax).

125

Penn Mut. Indem., 32 T.C. at 661.

Direct Taxes are not, as Woodrow Wilson

proclaimed in 1885, favored in America: “All direct taxes are heartily disliked. . . .” WOODROW
WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 100 (1981)
126

The 16th Amendment says nothing about uniformity: “Congress shall have the power

to lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among
the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
127

Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 24 (federal income tax subject to Uniformity Clause after 16th

Amendment).
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income prior to the 16th Amendment.128 The sole purpose of the 16th Amendment was to
relieve Congress of the obligation to apportion income taxes.129 But only direct taxes are subject
to apportionment. There is no dispute today—and arguably no dispute prior to the ratification of
the 16th Amendment—that income taxes are indirect taxes and, as such, are not subject to the
apportionment clauses.130 As a consequence, the 16th Amendment served no real purpose.
II.

Circuit-Specific Application of the Internal Revenue Code
In recent years, the IRS has instituted an official practice of applying various parts of the

Internal Revenue Code in only some states. This occurs when the IRS disagrees with a federal
circuit court’s interpretation of the Code. In such cases, the IRS issues a formal opinion stating
that it will adhere to the circuit court’s interpretation of the tax law in states in that circuit, but
not in other states. As a result, different tax laws are being applied in different states in direct
contravention of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Uniformity Clause.

128

Flint, 220 U.S. at 151-52. “Among the numerous indirect taxes imposed by Congress

under article I, section 8, of the Constitution were the various income taxes levied for a period of
nearly 10 years at about the time of the Civil War.” Penn Mut. Indem., 32 T.C. at 662.
129

Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 17-19.

130

Flint, 220 U.S. at 150-151 (holding that a corporate income tax was an indirect tax and

thus not subject to the apportionment clauses).
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Three examples of the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law should suffice. In
a Field Service Advisory dated August 7, 1992,131 the IRS was asked to opine on whether a
taxpayer is entitled to interest, for the period when the taxpayer’s refund checks were initially
issued until the time when they were reissued, on checks that were mailed to the wrong address.
The IRS declared that the taxpayer was not entitled to interest. The IRS made clear, however,
that the outcome would have been different had the taxpayer resided in New York, Connecticut,
or Vermont.132 Why the geographical distinction? In 1990, the Second Circuit had ruled in
Doolin v. United States,133 that a similarly situated taxpayer was entitled to interest. The IRS,
though, refused to apply Doolin outside the Second Circuit: “The Service does not intend to
follow the decision in any circuit, except the Second Circuit.”134 By so doing, the IRS is

131

1992 WL 1355759 (Aug. 7).

132

The Second Circuit is comprised of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont.

133

918 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Under all the circumstances, we cannot agree that there

was a proper tender of the March 1986 check to plaintiffs; that check was therefore not a
“refund check” within the meaning of § 26 U.S.C. 6611(b)(2). Accordingly, the first check that
was properly tendered was the March 1990 check, and plaintiffs are entitled to appropriate
interest for the period between March 18, 1986 and a date within 30 days of March 9, 1990, the
date of the ‘refund check.’”).
134

1992 WL 1355759 (Aug. 7).
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applying federal tax law differently in some states than it is in others. As a result, residents of
New York are entitled to interest but residents of California are not.
Second, in A.O.D. 1994-004,135 the IRS issued a nonacquiescence in response to a
decision of the Eighth Circuit involving the correction of a prohibited transfer under § 4975.136
The Eighth Circuit had held that corrections under § 4975(f)(5) are automatic and thus no
additional tax was owed by the taxpayers.137 The IRS disagreed, opining that the taxpayers had
failed to take the proper actions to correct a prohibited sale or exchange under § 4975(c)(1)(a)

135

A.O.D. 1994-004, 1994 WL 805237 (May 31).

136

I.R.C. § 4975 imposes additional taxes on certain prohibited transfers from qualified

pension plans.
137

Zabolotny v. Commissioner, 7 F.3d 774, 778 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993) (“The IRS also asserts

that, because § 4975(a) imposes a blanket prohibition on certain types of transaction regardless
of the transaction’s financial success and demands a 5% of the value of the transaction from the
disqualified person involved whether or not the transaction turned out to be a ‘good deal,’ the
same standards should apply to § 4975(b).

We disagree.

Congress created a two-tier, not a

one-tier, tax liability scheme, and one of the distinguishing features of the second-tier tax is that
instead of being imposed automatically it is avoidable through correction. The mandatory nature
of the first-tier excise tax simply does not require us to hold that the financial consequences of
the transaction to the plan are irrelevant for the purposes determining the propriety of a secondtier excise tax liability.”) (citations omitted).
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and thus a 100% tax was due under § 4975(b).138 Despite the fact that no other circuit courts had
ruled on this issue, the IRS declared that it would continue to apply § 4975(f)(5) in a manner
inconsistent with the Eighth Circuit’s opinion, but only for taxpayers living outside the Eighth
Circuit.139

Thus, taxpayers residing in, say, Arkansas,140 are treated differently than those

residing in, say, Colorado.
Third, in Revenue Ruling 72-583,141 the IRS declared two rules for gifts to political
campaigns. If the taxpayer resides, say, in Virginia or any other state outside the Fifth Circuit,142
gifts to political campaigns are considered taxable gifts under the federal gift tax. For taxpayers
residing in Texas or any other state within the Fifth Circuit, such gifts are not taxable. Why?
Because the Fifth Circuit had so held.143

138

AOD 1994-004, 1994 WL 805237 (May 31).

139

A.O.D. 1994-004, 1994 WL 805237 (May 31).

140

The Eighth Circuit is comprised of Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,

North Dakota, and South Dakota.
141

1972-2 C.B. 534. Revenue Ruling 1972-2 was subsequently superceded by statute.

See I.R.C. § 2501(e).
142

The Fifth Circuit is comprised of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.

143

United States v. Stern, 436 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1971) (“The transactions in controversy

were permeated with commercial and economic factors. The contributions were motivated by
44

In all three examples, the IRS is applying one tax law in some states and another tax law
other states. And the IRS’s distinction is based solely on geography, as the federal circuits are
drawn on state political boundaries. The IRS’s distinction is not based on state law or the
taxpayers themselves. This is nothing more, therefore, than a non-uniform application of the tax
law by the federal government.
III.

Application of the Uniformity Clause to the IRS
“The Uniformity Clause requires that an excise tax apply, at the same rate, in all portions

of the United States where the subject of the tax is found.”144 If Congress passed a law that
applied different taxes to different circuits, the law would undoubtedly violate the Uniformity
Clause. The IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax laws, therefore, clearly violates the

appellee’s desire to promote a slate of candidates that would protect and advance her personal
and property interests. To assure that the funds would be spent in a manner consonant with the
attainment of that goal, appellee and her group retained control over the disbursement of their
contributions. In a very real sense, then, Mrs. Stern was making an economic investment that
she believed would have a direct and favorable effect upon her property holdings and business
interests in New Orleans and Louisiana. These factors, in conjunction with the undisputed
findings of the lower court that the expenditures were bona fide, at arms length and free from
donative intent, lead us, in light of what we have said above, to the conclusion that the
expenditures satisfy the spirit of the Regulations and are to be considered as made for an
adequate and full consideration.”).
144

Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 84 (emphasis added).
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spirit of the Uniformity Clause, as the IRS is applying different tax laws to different states.145
But does the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law violate the letter of the Uniformity
Clause?
The Uniformity Clause is contained in Article I of the Constitution.146 By its terms,
therefore, it does not limit the actions of the IRS; it applies only to Congress.147

As a

consequence, it is arguable that only Congress, and not the IRS, can violate the Uniformity
Clause. Such an argument, however, would render the Uniformity Clause meaningless.
There are two ways of viewing the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law. First,
it could be argued that the Uniformity Clause applies only to the legislative process, and the IRS
is not making law, but simply choosing not to enforce an otherwise uniform law in some states.
The problem with this argument is that the “power to alter or repeal laws is a legislative power
and executive officers may not by means of construction, rules and regulations, orders or
otherwise, extend, alter, repeal, set at naught or disregard laws enacted by the legislature.”148

145

The federal circuits follow state political boundaries.

The Seventh Circuit, for

instance, includes Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.
146

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

147

As part of the executive branch, the IRS is governed by Article II of the Constitution.

148

Peony Park, 121 F. Supp. at 695. Congress, not the Internal Revenue Service, is the

appropriate body to consider substantive changes to the tax laws. Investment Annuity, Inc. v.
Blumenthal, 442 F. Supp. 681, 693 (D.D.C. 1997). See also Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432,
46

This is particular true in the area of tax law, where courts have held that it is unlawful for the IRS
to adopt different enforcement policies for different circuits: “The letter of the Commissioner
[setting forth a different enforcement policy for the Eighth Circuit] could not have the effect of
changing the law. Insofar as the Commissioner adopted an enforcement policy contrary to the
statute, the enforcement policy was unlawful.”149
Alternatively, it could be argued that the IRS is involved in the legislative process by
virtue of the fact that Congress has delegated its power to make tax law to the IRS.150 It is well
settled that the executive branch lacks the independent power to impose taxation; only Congress
has that authority.151 Accordingly, any power the IRS has to impose tax law must have been

1441 (9th Cir. 1983) (Pregerson, J., concurring) (agency’s refusal to adhere to circuit court’s
decision is “akin to the repudiated pre-Civil War doctrine of nullification”); Stieberger v.
Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (nonacquiescence renders “[t]he judiciary’s
duty and authority . . . to say what the law is . . . a virtual nullity”).
149

Peony Park, 121 F. Supp. at 695.

150

Congress’s delegation powers are virtually unlimited. See, e.g., Whitman v. American

Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001).
151

Inland Prods. Co. v. Blair, 31 F.2d 867, 868 (4th Cir. 1929) (“The Revenue Acts in

force in 1918 and 1919 did not impose the soft drink tax upon sweet cider, and the regulations of
the Revenue Department attempting to impose it were void.”); Investment Annuity, 442 F. Supp.
at 693; Peony Park, 121 F. Supp. at 695.
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delegated to it by Congress.152 When Congress delegates powers to the executive branch,
however, the executive branch assumes those powers subject to the same constitutional
restrictions that limited Congress’s power.153 For example, the First Amendment provides that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . .”154 By its terms, only
Congress, and not the executive branch, is subject to the First Amendment. If applied literally,
the executive branch could promulgate regulations that abridge free speech with impunity. Such
a construction would, of course, render the First Amendment meaningless, and courts have so
held:
Petitioner argues that the [FCC’s] regulations . . . violate the First
Amendment. The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” Although the text of
the First Amendment refers to legislative enactments by Congress,
it is actually much broader in scope and encompasses, among other
things, regulations promulgated by administrative agencies.155
152

Congress has the authority to delegate its Article I, § 8 powers to the executive branch.

California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 59 (1974); District of Columbia v. Thompson
Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109 (1953) (Congress may delegate its legislate power “subject of course to
constitutional limitations to which all lawmaking is subservient.”).
153

See, e.g., U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).

154

U.S. CONST. amend. 1.

155

U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1232 (First Amendment prohibits FCC from requiring

telecommunications company to obtain affirmative approval from customers before company
could use that customer’s proprietary network information for marketing purposes).
48

The same holds true for restrictions on Congress contained in Article I on the Constitution:
“Congress may delegate [under Article I, § 8, cl. 17 its] . . . full legislative power, subject of
course to constitutional limitations to which all lawmaking is subservient . . . .”156 Obviously,
Congress cannot delegate more power than it has: “[O]ur operating premise must be that an
agency, or as here, an executive office with delegated power to promulgate rules, cannot have
greater power to regulate . . . conduct than does Congress.”157 Otherwise, Congress could easily
avoid constitutional restrictions like the Uniformity Clause by simply delegating authority to the
executive branch. Accordingly, if the IRS is imposing tax law— rather than enforcing tax law—
it must do so in compliance with the Uniformity Clause.158
In summary, when the IRS applies tax law in a circuit-specific manner, it is either
unlawfully refusing to enforce a tax statute in certain states or imposing a non-uniform tax law in
violation of the Uniformity Clause. In either case, the IRS’s actions are unconstitutional.

156

Thompson, 346 U.S. at 109.

157

Neinast v. Texas, 217 F.3d 275, 281 (5th Cir. 2000).

158

See generally, Margaret L. Thum, Confusion in the Courts: The Failure to Tax

Punitive Damages Uniformly in Personal Injury Cases, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 591 (1996)
(arguing that inconsistent circuit court decisions violate the Uniformity Clause); Gary L.
Rodgers, The Commissioner “Does Not Acquiesce,” 59 NEB. L. REV. 1001, 1009 (1980)
(suggesting that inconsistent interpretation of tax laws by courts could violate Uniformity
Clause).
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IV.

Proposal
The IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law violates the spirit, if not the letter, of

the Uniformity Clause. The IRS, however, is not totally to blame. The real culprit is a judicial
system in which thirteen different circuit courts independently interpret federal tax law.159 When
the IRS disagrees with a circuit court’s interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS has
three unappealing choices. It can apply the tax law in accordance with the circuit court’s
interpretation in that circuit, but not in other circuits. This is the IRS’s current practice, which
arguably violates the Uniformity Clause.160 Alternatively, the IRS could apply the tax law in
accordance with the circuit court’s interpretation in all circuits. Under this approach, each circuit
court would effectively speak for the entire nation, raising the circuit court’s prominence to that
of the United States Supreme Court. This approach is not followed in other areas of federal

159

ROSWELL MAGILL, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES 209 (1943) (“If we were seeking

to secure a state of complete uncertainty in tax jurisprudence, we would hardly do better than to
provide for 87 Courts [as of 1943] with original jurisdiction, 11 appellate bodies [now 13] of
coordinate rank, and only a discretionary review of relatively few cases by the Supreme Court.”).
Appeals from district courts are heard by the circuit court in which that district is located. See 28
U.S.C. § 1294. Appeals from the Tax Court are heard by the circuit court in which the taxpayer
resides. See 26 U.S.C. § 7482. Appeals from the Court of Federal Claims are heard by the
Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295. In all, 13 different circuit courts hear tax appeals.
160

See Section II, supra.
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law,161 and, of course, is not feasible where there are contradictory circuit court
interpretations.162 Finally, the IRS could, theoretically, ignore the circuit court’s interpretation
altogether.163 But this alternative violates one of the first principles of judicial review: a federal

161

See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996) (invalidating affirmative

action programs in 5th Circuit only), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
162

If there were a split in the circuits, the IRS, under this alternative, would have no

choice but to apply different laws in different states. Circuit splits are not uncommon in tax law.
For example, the circuits are split on whether a contingent fee is a part of the client’s taxable
income. Compare Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275, 1279-80 (11th Cir.2001); Srivastava
v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353, 364-65 (5th Cir.2000); Davis v. Commissioner, 210 F.3d 1346
(11th Cir.2000) (per curiam); Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir.2000);
Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119, 125-26 (5th Cir.1959), with Young v. Commissioner,
240 F.3d 369, 376-79 (4th Cir.2001); Coady v. Commissioner, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.2000),
and Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir.1995).
163

This practice has been condemned by courts. See, e.g., Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1441

(Pregerson, J., concurring) (agency’s refusal to adhere to circuit court’s decision is “akin to the
repudiated pre-Civil War doctrine of nullification”); Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1357
(nonacquiescence doctrine renders “[t]he judiciary’s duty and authority . . . to say what the law is
. . . a virtual nullity”).
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court’s interpretation of federal law is final and controlling.164 Accordingly, any proposal to
reform the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law must start with a change in the
appellate process.
The simplest and best solution would be to require all federal tax appeals to be heard in a
single forum. This Article, therefore, proposes that Congress amend 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) by
adding a provision granting exclusive jurisdiction of federal tax appeals to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.165 The Federal Circuit was created to provide “a forum for appeals from
throughout the country in areas of the law where Congress determines that there is special need

164

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“the federal judiciary is supreme in the

exposition of the law”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (“It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
165

Such an amendment could read: “(a) The United States Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction--

* * *

(15) of appeals from a final decision of the United States Court of
Federal Claims, the United States Tax Court, or a United States
District Court involving claims under Title 26 (the Internal
Revenue Code).
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for . . . uniformity.”166 For example, in an effort to unify and stabilize the law of patents,
Congress assigned jurisdiction over virtually all federal patent appeals to the Federal Circuit.167
This exclusive jurisdiction, many argue, has added a needed stability and unity to the law of

166

S. Rep. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News

1982, pp. 13 (Nov. 18, 1981). “[T]here are areas of the law in which the appellate courts reach
inconsistent decisions on the same issue, or in which—although the rule of law may be fairly
clear—courts apply the law unevenly when faced with the facts of individual cases.” Id. at 13.
The Federal Circuit was designed to provide “a prompt, definitive answer to legal questions” in
these areas. Id. at 11.
167

Id. at 11, 12-17. According to 28 U.S.C. § 1295, “[t]he United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a decision of (A)
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
with respect to patent applications and interferences, at the instance of an applicant for a patent
or any party to a patent interference, and any such appeal shall waive the right of such applicant
or party to proceed under section 145 or 146 of title 35; (B) the Under Secretary of Commerce
for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office or the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board with respect to applications for registration of marks and
other proceedings as provided in section 21 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1071); or
(C) a district court to which a case was directed pursuant to section 145, 146, or 154(b) of title
35.”
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patents.168

There is no reason the Federal Circuit could not do the same for tax law.169

Uniformity is needed in tax law ever bit as much as patent law: “[U]niformity among the

168

See e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing

Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 754 (2001); Howard T. Markey, The Federal Circuit and
Congressional Intent, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 577, 577 (1992) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s
success in fulfilling Congress’s desire to create uniformity in patent law); Allan M. Soobert,
Breaking New Grounds in Administrative Revocation of U.S. Patents: A Proposition for
Opposition—And Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 63, 104 (1998) (“The
Federal Circuit has, for the most part, been successful in achieving its primary goal of providing
uniformity in patent law.”); Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., The Federal Circuit- First Ten Years of
Patentability Decisions, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 499, 504 (1992) (Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks opining that “[t]he first ten years of Federal Circuit jurisprudence has restored
efficiency and reliability to the patent law”).
169

Appeals,

See generally Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Final

Report

73

(Dec.

18,

1998),

available

at

http://app.comm.

uscourts.gov/final/appstruc.pdf (suggesting that a specialized court of tax appeals is unnecessary
and that tax appeals should be centralized in the Federal Circuit). Alternatively, Congress could
create a new appellate court to hear all tax appeals. Various tax jurists, practitioners, and
academics have proposed the creation of a court of tax appeals. None of these proposals,
however, was prompted by the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law. See, e.g., H.
Todd Miller, A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85 YALE L.J. 228 (1975); Oscar E. Bland,
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circuits is particularly desirable in tax cases to ensure equal application of the tax system to our
citizenry.”170 Indeed, as this Article illustrates, uniformity of tax law is not only desirable, it is
constitutionally prescribed.
Congress has nearly unlimited authority to modify or expand the appellate jurisdiction of
federal courts; thus, the proposed amendment would be constitutional.171 Moreover, the Federal
Circuit’s interpretation of the tax law would be final and binding on the IRS, subject only to

Federal Tax Appeals, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (1925); MAGILL, supra note 158, at 209; Roger
J. Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxes—A
Criticism and a Proposal, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1393 (1938); Charles L.B. Lowndes, Taxation and
the Supreme Court, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 165 (1938); Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of
Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1944); Gary W. Carter, The Commissioner’s
Nonacquiescence: A Case for a National Court of Tax Appeals, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 879 (1986).
170

Washington Energy Co. v. United States, 94 F.3d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting

Gibraltar Fin. Corp. v. United States, 825 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir.1987)); First Charter Fin.
Corp. v. United States, 669 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1982); Keasler v. United States, 766 F.2d
1227, 1233 (8th Cir. 1985).
171

See, e.g., Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) (upholding statute removing

Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions); but see United States v.
Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871) (suggesting that Congress’s power over the court’s appellate
jurisdiction is not unlimited).
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review by the United States Supreme Court or, in some instances, a Congressional amendment to
the tax law.
This proposal offers several advantages to the current state of the law. Appeals from
final decisions of the district courts, the Court of Federal Claims, and the Tax Court would be
heard by a single circuit court.172 This would eliminate inconsistent circuit court decisions, as all
tax appeals would be decided by the Federal Circuit.173 In the event of inconsistent decisions by
different panels of the Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit could resolve such inconsistencies en
banc.174 The Tax Court has adhered to such a policy for years.175

172

Under current law, the Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over tax cases arising

out of the Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295 (“The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final
decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims”).
173

Appeals would continue to be as a matter of right. See e.g., McDonald v. United

States, 13 Cl. Ct. 255, 265 n.3 (1987) (parties have a “right to appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit”). Thus, the IRS could appeal any trial court decision with
which it disagrees. This would prevent the trial courts from becoming the new bastion of nonuniformity.
174

FED. CIR. R. 35 (“A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service

may order that an appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en banc.
An en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en
56

Because the Federal Circuit’s decision would be final, binding, and not subject to
inconsistent circuit court interpretations, non-acquiescence would not be an option for the IRS.
Under the proposal, the IRS must apply the tax law as interpreted by the Federal Circuit until
such time as the Federal Circuit’s interpretation is modified or overruled by the Supreme Court
or the tax law is amended by Congress.176 As a result, the IRS would no longer have any reason
to apply the tax law in a circuit-specific manner because there will be only one circuit court
interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby eliminating any Uniformity Clause
problems.

banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (2)
the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.”). The Federal Circuit also has
the power to stay enforcement, pending appeal, of any trial court decision. FED. CIR. R. 8.
175

In the Tax Court, every proposed decision of a trial judge must be referred to the chief

judge before release to assure consistency with the court’s existing position. The chief judge may
refer the case to the full Tax Court for possible change. I.R.C. § 7460.
176

See generally, The First Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 100 F.R.D. 499 (1983) (“A single court of tax appeals, insulated
as a practical matter from any but the rarest Supreme Court review, but always subject to
correction through the legislative process, inevitably would promote uniformity and coherence.
Things would not always be settled “right,” as losing litigants and the similarly situated will
assert with fervor, but subject to congressional review they will be settled. That seems to me
worth a great deal.”).
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Fourth, if the Federal Circuit hears all tax appeals, that court can develop an expertise in
tax matters, as it has in patent cases: “Clearly, the Federal Circuit has developed patent expertise
of a higher average level than that previously found in the regional circuits, as a result of
deciding over 200 patent appeals per year. The fact that the Federal Circuit has a principal
responsibility for the patent system, rather than for deciding the odd case, contributes to the
development of that expertise.”177 The same should hold true for tax appeals.178 Tax law is
every bit as intricate and incoherent as patent law, particularly to generalized judges who rarely

177

J. Pegram, Should There be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in Patent

Litigation, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 766, 788 (2000). See also Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997); Micro Motion, Inc. v. Exac Corp., 741
F. Supp. 1426, 1434 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (noting the special expertise of the Federal Circuit in
patent cases).
178

First Annual Judicial Conference, supra note 175, at 499 (“A court of tax appeals

would be a specialist’s tribunal. Sensibly, I think, it would be a tax specialist tribunal, its
jurisdiction limited to and exclusive . . . over appeals of cases arising under the federal tax laws.
Sacrificed in the process, necessarily, is the leavening influence of the generalist appellate judge.
Taking account of what our Internal Revenue Code and regulations have become, and likely will
remain, I think it a price worth paying.”).
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encounter tax appeals.179 Expertise alone, therefore, may well reduce the number of inconsistent
tax law interpretations.180
Finally, there is no reason to believe that the Federal Circuit would become a tool of the
IRS. “No tax venue restrains the IRS’s aggression and power better than the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals. Other tax venues lack the Federal Circuit’s history and monetary-claim

179

Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 188 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Every

experienced tax practitioner also knows that our Internal Revenue Code is a structured and
complicated instrument perhaps too complex that deserves careful and historical analysis when,
as here, longstanding provisions of that Code are challenged.”); Koss v. United States, 69 F.3d
705, 712 (3d Cir. 1995) (“We cannot close this opinion without making an additional
observation. It is, of course, commonplace to note that the Internal Revenue Code is remarkably
complicated.

In this case, these complications have cost the Kosses dearly. Indeed, at oral

argument we were told that their debt to the IRS now exceeds $300,000 because of the inclusion
of interest.

Yet it is very possible that, but for the operation of the non-substantive, highly

technical procedural provisions that have been applied, they would not owe this money. We are
disturbed by the harsh result.”)
180

Congress created the Federal Circuit to achieve consistency in patent cases by avoiding

the “contradictory decisions often issued by the 12 existing Courts of Appeal and seldom
untangled by the Supreme Court.” Paula Dwyer, et al., The Battle Raging Over “Intellectual
Property,” BUS. WK., May 2, 1989, at 79.
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expertise. The Federal Circuit specializes in bringing uniform justice to disputes between the
United States and its citizens.”181
V.

Conclusion
The Internal Revenue Code is interpreted by thirteen different circuit courts. The circuit

courts’ interpretations, though, are not always in accord, but they are usually final, as the
Supreme Court rarely hears tax appeals.182 As a result, the IRS is often forced to apply different
tax laws in different circuits in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Uniformity Clause of
the Constitution. But there is a simple, practical, and constitutional solution to this problem.
This Article proposes that Congress amend 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a) by adding a provision
granting exclusive jurisdiction of federal tax appeals to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.

Such an amendment would not only unify and stabilize the tax law, it would

permanently solve the Uniformity Clause issue identified in this Article.
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Christopher R. Egan, Checking the Beast: Why the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Is

Good for the Federal System of Tax Litigation, 56 SMU L. REV. 721, 743-44 (2003).
182

“‘This is a tax case. Deny.’ This was [Justice’s] Brennan’s normal reaction to a cert

request in a tax case.” BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE

THE

SUPREME COURT 429 (1979). See also See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals, supra note 168 (infrequent Supreme Court review of tax cases often
leaves the interpretation of the tax law unsettled for years).
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